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Abstract 
 
Title of Dissertation: Seafarer Training in Somalia as a Deterrent to Piracy 
Degree:        MSc 
 
This dissertation is a study into the development of seafarer training in Somalia as a 
deterrent to piracy off the coast of Somalia. The number of piratical attacks attributed 
Somali pirates has decreased dramatically in recent years due to the deterrent of 
private armed security guards on-board commercial vessels and naval patrols by 
stakeholder nations. However, these anti-piracy measures cannot be said to have 
addressed the root causes of the piratical problem in Somalia, such as poverty and 
absence of good governance. The development of seafarer training in Somalia is 
therefore examined, in this study, as a new potential solution to the piratical problem 
off the coast of Somalia. 
 
Online questionnaires and semi-structured interviews were used as research 
instruments. Questionnaires were sent to Japanese shipping companies and students 
of a maritime academy in Somalia. Semi-structured interviews of maritime 
stakeholders were conducted in person (by the researcher) on site in Somalia.  
 
From the analyses of the data collected using the research instruments, it was found 
that there is quite high interest level of Somali people for the development of seafarer 
training. The steady found grounds to conclude that seafarer training in Somalia could 
be a deterrent to piracy. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Somalia, Somaliland, Seafarer, Maritime, Training, Education, Piracy, 
Deterrent   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
For five years, since 2007, the number of piratical attacks (actual and attempted) 
attributed to Somali pirates ranked first in the world. In the peak year, 2011, 200 
attacks attributed to Somali pirates were reported (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 
2012). This number decreased dramatically due to the deterrent of private armed 
security guards on-board commercial vessels and naval patrols by stakeholder 
nations. According to the latest annual report published by ICC International Maritime 
Bureau (2016), the number of piratical attacks attributed to Somali pirates decreased 
greatly from 2012 to 2014; no piratical attack attributed to Somali pirates was reported 
in 2015. Have Somali pirates disappeared from the world? Not quite. The afore-
mentioned anti-piracy measures, armed security guards and naval patrols cannot be 
said to have addressed the root causes of the piratical problem in Somalia. 
 
The root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia may include a lack of control by the 
coastal state, Somalia, and poverty (Osei-Tutu, 2011). After the collapse of the Siad 
Barre regime in 1991 till the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia 
(FGS), there was no formal central government in Somalia. Somalia was called a 
"failed state" in the world (Endo, 2015). 
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Because of the absence of the central government, there was no naval or police 
control over Somalia waters. It allowed foreigners to exploit the resources in the 
waters off the Horn of Africa. Many foreign vessels invaded the water and conducted 
Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) activity (Murphy, 2011). IUU activities were 
conducted on a large scale with modern methods by large fishing vessels, compared 
to local fishermen who only used was small boats and traditional fishing gear. The fish 
stock off the coast of Somalia was severely impacted by these IUU activities. 
Moreover, illegal dumping by foreign vessels, exacerbated the damage to the 
environment and fish stock. The local population, who in many cases, was heavily 
reliant on fishing, lost this source of income and became increasingly poor. 
Consequently, they took up the arms to protect their waters. Later, piracy off the coast 
of Somalia was transformed in style and scale to become a big business; it is no 
longer fishermen's defensive activity (Osei-Tutu, 2011).  
 
Given that these conditions that started the phenomenon of piracy of Somalia has not 
changed, it can be argued that the root cause of piracy has not changed. Unless the 
problem of poverty in Somalia (often triggered by external factors), is solved, the 
piratical problem of Somalia would not be solved. Therefore, current anti-piracy 
measures relying on military power cannot be expected to be the ultimate solution to 
root out piracy off the coast of Somalia in the long term. These measures are just 
suppressing the pirates. If the IUU activities in Somali waters were to continue, 
poverty remain at current levels, and military power suppressing piracy were removed, 
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Somali pirates could be expected to the surface/increase again (Stewart, 2015). It is 
reasonable; therefore, to suggest that a new solution (unlike the current measures) is 
required to root out this phenomenon.  
 
Development of education and the creation of employment opportunities have been 
shown to improve poverty and reduce crimes. The Association for the Development 
of Education in Africa (2016) note, for example, that “education is key in addressing 
the root causes of conflict and instability in Africa”. Similarly, Moretti (2005) and the 
Chicago Urban League (n.d.) respectively indicate that “increased educational 
achievement in young men reduces the probability that they will engage in criminal 
activity, and thereby decreases crime-related costs” and that “youth employment 
opportunities reduce crime”. This research work puts forward the hypothesis that 
"seafarer training in Somalia could serve as a deterrent to piracy" and seek to analyze 
the effectiveness and feasibility of this approach. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Piracy is of great concern to the world. Piracy threatens maritime security and the 
safety of seafarers' lives. In the last five years, 2,742 seafarers were assaulted, held 
as hostages, injured, kidnapped, went missing, threatened, or killed by pirates in total 
(ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2016). At the end of 2010, approximately 500 
seafarers from more than 18 countries were held hostage by pirates. Piracy damages 
the international economy and disrupts world trade. Stakeholders in the shipping 
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industry have been forced by threats and actual acts of piracy to pay large amounts 
of money for ransoms, insurance, re-routeing, security equipment, armed guards and 
naval forces, piracy prosecutions, and anti-piracy organizations. Between 7 to 12 
billion USD. were spent for these measures related to piracy (Bowden, 2010). There 
is an urgent need for piracy to be eradicated to secure maritime security and the world 
economy. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the merits of a suggested new 
approach/solution to the piratical problems attributed to Somalia. The suggested 
approach/solution is the development of seafarer training in Somalia. In this research 
effort, the effectiveness and feasibility of development of seafarer training in Somalia 
as a deterrent to piracy, will be analyzed. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The research will be conducted based on the following questions: 
 
 Could the sustainable development of Somali seafarers be a deterrent to the 
Somali piracy? 
 Do the Somali people have an interest in developing the Somali seafarers for 
employment in the international shipping industry? 
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 Do shipping companies have an interest in employing Somali seafarers? 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses and examines the literature on piracy, impact of education on 
crime, traditional social system in Somalia, modern history of Somalia, and current 
situation in Somalia. Examining the literature about piracy would help develop an 
understanding of current piratical issues in Somali waters. Similarly, examining the 
literature about the impact of education on crime would help interrogate the possible 
impact of seafarer training on piracy. Moreover, interrogating the traditional social 
system and modern history of Somalia would help to understand the background of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia. Furthermore, examining the current situation in 
Somalia with respect to its different regions, would help the selection of the location 
for developing seafarer training. 
 
2.2 Piracy 
2.2.1 Definition of Piracy 
 
Piracy is categorized as "hostis humani generis" - common enemy of the humankind. 
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This definition allows for universal jurisdiction over this crime, in terms of arrest and 
prosecution. However, it is not easy to clamp down on piracy conducted on the open 
sea. Historically, coastal states and the international community have made great 
efforts to clamp down and root out it (Itsumi, 2009). To understand piracy correctly, it 
is essential to understand the definition of piracy. The New Oxford Dictionary defined 
it as "the practice of attacking and robbing at sea" (Pearsall, 2001, p.1411). However, 
the international maritime community has given a narrower definition drawn from the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS in article 101 
(1982), defines piracy as: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, 
and directed:  
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 
(a) or (b). 
This means piracy is conducted only for private ends. The UNCLOS definition of 
piracy does not include similar acts committed in territorial waters.  
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Counter measures by the international society against piracy have been conducted in 
the context of this UNCLOS definition. Given the notion of hostis humani generis, any 
state can arrest pirates on the high sea and prosecute them within its jurisdiction. 
While this remains true, the practice of piracy itself as well as the international 
community has changed. The current state of piracy is quite different from piracy in 
earlier centuries. Pirates are no longer people wearing eye patches or with the sword 
artificial hook hands. The scope of 21st century piratical activities is broad and use is 
made of advanced weaponry. In addition, the state of Somalia – perceived by some 
as a “failed state” (Endo, 2015, p.55) made the situation surrounding the potential for 
piracy in the waters off the horn of Africa more complicated. To gain a correct 
understanding of piracy, a discussion of its history is as essential as the legal definition. 
 
2.2.2 Legendary and Modern Pirates 
 
Piracy has origins in very early centuries. Actually, it has been called the second oldest 
profession (Manuel, 2012). Moreover, it could be seen in many places in the world. 
Bradford (2007) classified the age and the place of piracy as follows: 
1. The Greeks (800–146 BC) 
2. The Romans (753 BC to AD 476) 
3. The Vikings (AD 793–1066) 
4. The Buccaneers (1650–1701) 
5. The Barbary Pirates (1320–1785) 
6. The Tanka Pirates (1790–1820) 
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7. America and the Barbary Pirates (1785–1815) 
 
One of the oldest piratical activities is the one in the ancient Greece. In the beginning, 
it was not viewed as a criminal act but as "the industry of the ancient Mediterranean" 
(Irving, 2012). Originally, pirates in many cases were fishermen, but when their 
income was not enough to live, they restored to petty “piratical activity”. Subsequently 
Roman pirates appeared in ancient Mediterranean regions. Initially, Roman pirates 
were “tolerated” by the society and were involved in slave trading for profit. However, 
they became more radical; culminating in an attack on the port of Ostia and the 
kidnapping of two senators. As a result of this incident, Rome promulgated anti-piracy 
laws and started clamping down on piracy. The pirates, shut out from the then legal 
industry of activities such as slave trading turned to more radical activities involving 
significant ransoms (Irving, 2012). Pirates became the enemy of states, a criminal 
group of people. 
 
In the early middle ages, one of the most famous names of such groups appeared the 
"Vikings". They lived in Scandinavia, on agriculture, fishing, trade, and robbery. Their 
scale and geographical scope of their piratical activity were quite broad. They acted 
over the east Europe and attacked, pirated, and colonized. Their activities were quite 
different from today's piracy (Fjalldal, 2015). Buccaneers were lawful seafarers and 
soldier in Caribbean Sea. They attacked and robbed from Spanish ships under the 
colonial government's official permission. For Spanish people, they were just pirates, 
but they were more like a navy. They were organized and used powerful weapons. 
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However, after the end of the war between England and Spain, piratical activity was 
prohibited by law, and Buccaneers disappeared from the sea (The Way of the Pirates, 
n.d.). Barbary pirates, based on the north of Africa, also acted vigorously with ample 
funds and official authorization as privateers. They were mainly Muslims with African 
origins, but some were Europeans who having converted to Islam joined this piratical 
group. 
 
Today the pirates with official authorization such as privateers no longer exist. Piracy 
is now carried out by individuals or group of gangs. However, the nature of pirates has 
not changed from legendary pirates. They all seek to assault the ship, seize cargo 
and ship, kidnap crew as hostages for ransom. However, their way of perpetrating 
such act has changed dramatically. Pirates use night vision equipment, speed boats 
with modern equipment such as Global Positioning System (GPS) devices and radar, 
and are armed with heavy weapons such as “bazookas” and machine guns (Maritime 
Connector, n.d.). As shipping develops and globalizes, they have deepened their 
status as hostis humani generis at a global level. 
 
2.2.3 Somali Pirates 
 
One of the most significant factors that contributed to the genesis of modern piracy 
off the coast of Somalia was the absence of an “in-control” central government. In fact, 
no piratical attack on commercial vessels had been reported until the end of 1980s, 
the years that the national government of Somalia (the Siad Barre regime) began to 
 11 
 
weaken. The first reported piratical attack attributed to Somali pirates was reported in 
December 1989 (Samatar, Lindberg, & Mahayni, 2010). Subsequently, the number of 
piratical attacks attributed to Somali pirates increased radically from 2009, and 
peaked in 2011 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2013). After 2011, due to 
increasing anti-piracy measures, such as naval patrols by stake holders and the use 
of private armed security guards on-board commercial vessels, the number of piratical 
attacks attributed to Somali pirates decreased greatly. In 2015, no piratical attack was 
reported (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2015). However, the piratical attacks 
reported in 1989 and those reported in the 2000s were somewhat different in nature. 
Their motivation and objectives were not the same. To understand the piratical 
problem attributed to Somalia, it is essential to consider not only the number of attacks, 
but also the nature of piracy, such as motivation and objectives. According to the 
research of Samatar, Lindberg and Mahayni (2010), from 1989, there were four types 
of pirates off the coast of Somalia; they were "political pirates", "resource pirates", 
"defensive pirates" and "ransom pirates". 
 
Political pirates had been seen from 1989 to 1990. Their activities were conducted as 
a part of anti-government movement. To weaken the power of the national 
government, anti-government organizations tried to block the seaborne trade of 
Somalia. As a significant example of the political piracy, on December 1989, the Italian 
ship "Kwanda" was seized by one of the major anti-government organizations, Somali 
National Movement (SNM), and was released 27 days later. Their aim was to weaken 
the government; therefore, after the disintegration of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, 
 12 
 
political pirates disappeared from the sea (Samatar, Lindberg, & Mahayni, 2010). 
 
After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime however, due to the absence of good 
governance by the government, Somali fishery was despoiled through IUU fishing by 
foreign vessels. Moreover, Somali waters were polluted by illegal dumping conducted 
by foreign vessels. Samatar, Lindberg, and Mahayni (2010) called these foreign (non-
Somali) vessels engaged in IUU activities, resource pirates. 
 
As a counter movement against the resource pirates, the former coast guard of 
Somalia and local fishermen started confronting IUU fishing vessels and the vessels 
conducting illegal dumping using weapons. As an example, they seized a commercial 
vessel, "MV Bonsella", on 9th September 1994. Cargoes and money in the vessel 
were looted, but ransom was not demanded, because their aim was to use the vessel 
for eliminating the resource pirates (Murphy, 2007). Samatar, Lindberg, and Mahayni 
(2010) called these Somali “resistance forces”, defensive pirates. Murphy (2011) 
concurs with this terminology, calling the counter actions of the local Somali fishermen 
against IUU fishing "defensive piracy". 
 
Defensive pirates appeared as opponents against resource pirates, IUU fishing and 
illegal dumping. Their aim was to protect their waters from illegal activities. However, 
defensive pirates gradually evolved from their originating rationale and the nature of 
their activities. On 15th December 1994, two fishing vessels were captured by Somali 
pirates; and they demanded a ransom from the owners, a fishing company. 
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Consequently, 1,000,000 USD was paid as ransom to the pirates (Ocean Beyond 
Piracy, 2015). The objectives of the pirates thus changed from protection of the waters 
to earning money as ransom. Defensive pirates had transitioned in nature to the 
ransom pirates. 
 
It may be said that the pirates who have threatened international shipping off the coast 
of Somalia in the last few decades are “ransom pirates”. Their motivation is to earn 
money from the sea through criminal means. Moreover, the origin of ransom piracy 
was in defensive piracy triggered by IUU fishing and illegal dumping. To develop an 
adequate solution to the piratical problem off the coast of Somalia, the current 
motivation for piracy and the background of exploitation of IUU fishing and illegal 
dumping, as well as the absence of a strong functional central government, have to 
be acknowledged. To understand the cause of the absence of central government, 
knowing the modern history of Somalia is quite important. Similarly, understanding the 
traditional clan-based society of Somalia is essential to gaining an understanding of 
the modern history of Somalia. Furthermore, given that “increased educational 
attainment and improved school quality can significantly reduce crime rates” 
(Hjalmarsson & Lochner, 2012, p.49) the relationship between education and crime 
has to be explored. The following section, therefore, reviews the Somali traditional 
clan system, the modern history of Somalia as well as the impact of education on 
crime. 
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2.3 Impact of Education on Crime  
 
The impact of education on crime has been studied by many researchers. Moretti 
(2005) concluded in his paper that education reduces crime due to five reasons. First 
of all, it increases opportunity cost. Schooling increases individual’s wage earning 
capacity thus increasing the opportunity cost of crime. For the person who earns 
higher wages, the amount of “loss” gets bigger when crime is discovered. Secondly, 
there is a big loss where incarceration is a consequence of this person’s crime. When 
incarcerated people cannot, in most cases, work for profit. Therefore, for highly 
educated persons and high earners, the loss from incarceration would be bigger. 
Thirdly, education increases individual's patience and risk aversion. These 
characteristics could draw people away from crime. Fourthly, education encourages 
a law-abiding mindset. It could be psychic break with respect to crime. Finally, 
schooling keeps people away from the crime physically. Schools bind the youth to 
classrooms during day time. School attendance keeps students off the streets which 
could be the hotbed of crime. In this way, increase of education has positive impact 
on crime. Education could reduce crime. 
 
Quantitative values of the crime-reducing effect of education have been estimated by 
some researchers. Lochner and Moretti (2003) estimated that 10% of increase of high 
school graduation could reduce 20% of murder and assault, 13% of vehicle theft, and 
8% of arson. Machin, Marie, and Vujić (2011) estimated from the case study of 
England and Wales that one-year increase of schooling reduces violent crime more 
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than 20%. In contrast to this, however, Moretti (2005) also indicates not only the 
positive impact of education on crime, but also a possible negative impact. Certain 
white collar crimes, such as fraud, cybercrime, money laundering, and insider trading 
are mainly conducted by educated people. Moreover, education could help criminals 
to evade detection and punishment. Therefore, education also could have negative 
impact on crime, especially on white collar crime. Despite this fact, when the 
quantitative estimates of previous research (as mentioned earlier) are considered, the 
positive impact of education is likely to be much bigger than the negative impact. 
Especially regarding violent crime, education has a great impact as those estimated 
numbers show. 
 
As noted by the German Seamen's Mission (n.d.) piracy is a "violent crime against 
seafarers". Moreover, as mentioned previously, current Somali pirates are ransom 
pirates, whose aim is earning money (criminally) at sea. Therefore, the deterrent of 
education against crime introduced previously, could also have similar impact on 
piracy. Turkkahraman notes that "schools are an indispensable part of the general 
social system of societies" (2015, p.381) and thus, understanding a particular local 
society is quite important in interrogating exactly how that society can be developed 
through education. Moreover, the historical background that generated Somali pirates 
is also important. Accordingly, the literature on traditional Somali society and history 
are reviewed subsequently. 
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2.4 Somali Traditional Clan System and Common Law 
2.4.1 Clan-based Society 
 
"Somali society is highly structured, anchored in the system of clans and sub-clans 
that bind and divide Somalis" (CHF International, 2006, p.12). Traditional Somali clan-
based society has been influenced by colonial rule by European countries, 
dictatorship, anarchy, disunion and democratization. Hence, its influence and status 
are not completely the same as before and depend on regional location. However, 
definitely the clan system exists in today's Somalia, and understanding it is essential 
to understand Somalia. 
 
The majority of Somalis belong to clans which are believed to be descendants of 
Prophet Mohammed. The clan system is a patrilineal structured system. Hence, 
Somali children belong to their father's clan, fathers belong to grandfather's clan, and 
grandfathers belong to great-grandfather's clan. Generally, Somali people can trace 
their genealogy via their clan family and learn this by heart. In Somali's original 
nomadic culture which did not settle down in one place, knowing one’s clan and its 
origin was quite important to identify oneself. The clan system consists of a 
hierarchical structure. It starts from clan families, and branches from clan family to 
clan, clan to sub-clan, sub-clan to sub-sub-clan, and so on. The sense of belonging 
for the clan is stronger than that for the clan family, and the one for the sub-clan is 
stronger than the one for the clan. In smaller groups, loyalty becomes stronger (EASO, 
2014). Especially to the primary lineage group, people pay money called "diya" or 
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"mag" (translated literally "blood money"; generally, this is used as “compensation” 
when members of one diya paying group harm the other diya paying group members), 
and constitute a community (Sage, 2005). 
 
Clan families are divided in two group by their origin. The clan families which have 
their origin in nomadic pastoralists called "Somale", and the clan families which have 
their origin in pastoral people called "Saab". Somale has four clan families "Darood", 
"Hawiya", "Isaaq", and "Dir". The Darood clan family is divided into five clans, 
"Ogaden", "Mareexaan", "Majeerteen", "Warsangeli", and "Dhulbahante". Moreover, 
the federation of the three clans, Majeerteen, Warsangeli, and Dhulbahante is called 
"Harti". The Hawiya clan family is divided into six clans, "Gurreh", "Ajoran", "Mobilen", 
"Habr Gedir", "Sheikkel", and "Abgal". The Isaaq clan family is divided into four clans, 
"Habar Garhaji", "Habar Awal", "Habar Yunis", and "Habar Jeclo". The Dir clan family 
is divided into four clans, "Gadabursi", "Issa", "Samaroon", and "Bimaal" (Abbink, 
2009). Saab has a clan family called "Rahanweyn"; and it is divided into two clans, 
"Digil", and "Mirfle" (Endo, 2015) (see figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Genealogical table of major Somali clans 
 
Somali society does not consist of only majority clan families, but diverse minority 
groups, such as ethnic minority groups, religious minority groups, and occupational 
minority groups. Major ethnic minority groups do consist of the descents of migrants. 
They have different cultural and language backgrounds from majority Somalis. To be 
exact, they are not clan, but they are regarded and treated like clan by others. There 
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are five main ethnic minority groups, "Bantu", "Benadiri", "Sheikhal", "Ashraf", and 
"Bajuni". There is no exact data about the population of the ethnic minority groups. 
The population rate of the ethnic minorities is estimated between 6% and 33% of the 
population of Somalia (EASO, 2014). According to the Pew Research Center (2012), 
the population of Somalia was approximately 9,330,000 and 98.8% of them are 
Muslim. The remaining 0.2% people constitute the religious minority groups. The 
occupational minority groups have same cultural and ethnical backgrounds. However, 
they traditionally engage in the occupations considered impure or dishonorable. In the 
past, they were ranked as the lowest level of the social hierarchy. For example, the 
occupations, such as hunting, leather tanning, shoemaking, and blacksmith were 
discriminated against. There are many occupational minority groups in Somalia, such 
as "Midgaan", "Tumaal", "Yibir", "Galgale", "Gaheyle", "Yahhar", "Jaaji", "Musa 
Dheryo", "Guuleed Hadde", "Hawr Warsame", "Habar Yuqub", "Medgal", and 
"Warabeeye" (EASO, 2014). In addition, Hill (2010) consider "Boni" and "Eyle" as 
occupational minority groups also. They are not clans, but some of them have 
systems similar to the system major clans have. 
 
Generally, the clans and the minority groups mentioned above have their own territory 
or residential area. They fall, not only in the present territory of Somalia, but also in 
parts of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. For example, Majeerteen is dominant in 
Puntland, Hawiye is dominant in South Central Somalia, Isaaq is dominant in 
Somaliland, and Ogaden is dominant in the Ogaden region in Ethiopia as the name 
indicates. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) (2014) introduced two 
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detailed clan distribution maps made by Lewis, and Abikar (see figures 2 and 3). They 
are the only two maps which cover the lower level such as sub-clans, and sub-sub 
clans. 
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Figure 2: Map by Lewis 
Source: EASO. (2014). Map by Lewis (1955) [Map]. In EASO Country of Origin Information 
report South and Central Somalia Country Overview. Retrieved September 10, 2016, from 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/COI-Report-Somalia.pdf 
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Figure 3: Map by Abikar 
Source: EASO. (2014). Map by Abikar (1999) [Map]. In EASO Country of Origin Information 
report South and Central Somalia Country Overview. Retrieved September 10, 2016, from 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/COI-Report-Somalia.pdf 
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As the maps show, many Somali clans and minority groups are distributed in a rather 
confused manner in the Horn of Africa. 
 
2.4.2 Somali Traditional Customary Law 
 
There is an essential factor to understand Somali traditional clan-based society. It is 
Somali traditional customary law, "xeer". Xeer has been exist since long time ago. 
Even under the anarchy, Somalia was in order in certain level, due to the xeer. The 
influence of the xeer is not same as before. The rise of Islamist group in South, 
demilitarization of the clans, development of regular army and police, development of 
laws; these factors have weakened the influence of the clans and the xeer (Sage, 
2005). Nevertheless, xeer is still important in Somali society. EASO emphasized the 
influence of the xeer in the country of origin information report as following; "the 
protection mechanism exists all over Somalia, working best in rural areas" (2014, 
p.61). Moreover, the influence of the xeer is reinstating in specific areas where Al-
Shabaab withdrew (EASO, 2014). To understand Somali society, the xeer is still one 
of the indispensable factors. 
 
The xeer, apart from being the traditional customary law, is also a contractual 
arrangement between the clans. In this context, the size of the clans is not big like 
clan family, but small groups; diya/mag paying groups consist of between hundreds 
and thousands of men. The xeer can be divided in two parts; an unchangeable part 
"xeer guud" and a contractive part "xeer gaar". Furthermore, the most general 
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principles of xeer are called "xissi adakaaday" (Sage, 2005). The xissi adakaaday 
provides collective payment of diya/mag, maintenance of inter-clan harmony, family 
obligations, and resource-utilization rules (Indarat Maritime, 2011). 
 
An English translation of the word, "diya" or "mag" would be "blood money", as 
generally diya/mag is the money for the compensation for acts of murder or 
manslaughter or injury. It is not for the individuals but for the clans (diya/mag paying 
groups). For example, if a man belonging to diya/mag paying group "A" killed a man 
belonging to group "B", diya/mag collected from all individuals in group "A", is paid as 
compensation to group "B". Later, the compensation is shared in group "B" with the 
bereaved family getting a greater share. Generally, the xeer provided compensation 
for a male death as one-hundred camels, and for a female death fifty camels (CHF 
International, 2006). A noteworthy point is that the diya/mag paying group is obligated 
to compensate another group for an act committed by an individual. Individuals are 
protected by the group, but individual behavior could be a nuisance for the whole 
group. This fact helps restrain the acts of individual group members. 
 
The xeer is also applied to conflicts between clans. Traditional clan leaders determine 
adequate precedent(s) or find a new solution for new cases under the xeer to give 
judgments in respect of conflicts (Sage, 2005). Moreover, even in the state of war, the 
xeer restricts people's behavior. In the xeer, there is a rule called "Biri-ma-Geydo"; it 
is the traditional Somali customary code of war. In the context of Biri-ma-Geydo, 
"women, children, those innocently caught up in fighting, the wounded and the 
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captives would be protected and treated humanely during the conduct of hostilities" 
(ICRC, 2008). The xeer restrains not only individual behavior but also that of clans 
even in times of war. 
 
Thus, Somali people and clans are bound by the clan system and traditional 
customary law and contracts. In other words, they are protected by clan influence and 
the xeer. In the main, however, these social norms apply only for majority clans. 
Nevertheless, minority groups also can be protected by clan society and the xeer. 
They can establish client relationships with majority clans. This client relation is called 
"gaashaanbuur" (pile of shields). Through the gaashaanbuur, minority groups can also 
subscribe to the protection of the majority clans and the xeer. The gaashaanbuur is 
not mandatory but voluntary. Both of them, protection provider and protection receiver, 
can choose, by their own decision, to renounce the relationship (EASO, 2014). 
 
2.4.3 Summary 
 
Generally speaking, it is difficult for foreigners to identify to which clan a Somali 
individual belongs by appearance. The xeer is not written law, but oral law. These two 
factors make it difficult for foreigners to understand them. Nevertheless, to understand 
Somali history and present condition and to visualize potential scenarios about future 
of the Horn of Africa, making best efforts to know and understand the clan system is 
very important. It can be the cause conflicts, and it could be the key of the peace as 
well and affect the behavior (either criminal or non-criminal) of individuals and groups, 
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including behaviors and motivations that support the growth or otherwise of piracy. 
Somalia is still under the influence of clan system. 
 
2.5 Modern History of Somalia 
2.5.1 Colonial period 
 
Somalia has experienced three significant events in its modern history. They are 
colonial rule by foreign countries and subsequently, independence from these nations 
as well as a number of civil wars. Originally, Somali -as an ethnic group- lived in the 
horn of Africa regardless of national borders. However, in the period of colonial rule, 
they were segregated into five regions; Italian colony, British colony, French colony, 
Ethiopia, and British Kenya (Endo, 2015). After the end of colonial rule, today, their 
original inhabiting area in horn of Africa is divided in four countries, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, and Somalia. Colonial rule, in particular by Italy and Britain, influenced the civil 
wars after the independence and still greatly influences the current situation of 
Somalia. 
 
In 1887, Britain started to govern the north-western part of the horn of Africa as a 
protectorate called British Somaliland. However, Britain was not so active in respect 
of the colonial administration of this protectorate, probably because it was a place with 
limited resources, poor mineral resources and poor agriculture resource. That was 
one of reasons that nomadic culture had earlier developed in this area. In fact, British 
Somaliland was ranked lowest among the colonies which brought economic benefits 
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to the British Empire, resulting in Britain not having much interest in this colony. Britain 
governed this colony in an indirect way as part of British India, and through powerful 
local individuals (Millman, 2013). As a result, the earlier clan system of ruling this 
region was not destroyed by the colonial rule, but amplified (Center for Justice and 
Accountability, n.d.). However, Britain tried to convert the people to Christianity even 
though Islam was the established religion there. It aroused people's antipathy, and led 
to an intense resistive movement. Britain oppressed and attacked militarily the people 
who supported the resistance movement, until they overwhelmed the movement in 
1920. However, the resistance movement conducted by Abdullah Hassan and his 
votaries called "Dervishes" fought tenaciously for twenty years; the movement, 
organized within the frame work of the traditional clan system and encompassing 
many clan groups aroused Somali nationalism leading to Pan-Somalism – the aim for 
one great Somalia (Endo, 2015). 
 
Italy started to rule the north-eastern, central and southern part of the horn of Africa 
as a colony named Italian Somaliland. In contrast to the passive attitude of Britain to 
the British Somaliland, Italy administrated this colony positively and directly. Originally, 
the soil of this region was richer compared with the soil of British Somaliland. As a 
consequence, Italy made strategic plans to develop the agriculture potential of the 
area. Moreover, Italy developed infrastructures during the period of its colonial rule 
especially in Mogadishu. The resulting disparities between the north and the south 
increased over time and continued to be fueled by the different colonial rule styles of 
Britain and Italy (Center for Justice and Accountability, n.d.). Despite the “development” 
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of the Italian regions, Italian Somaliland was still a colony, and not a self-ruled State. 
There was discontent against colonial rule such as laws that were against the Somali 
people. In 1946, the Somali Youth League (SYL) was established, and appealed for 
the rectification of the unfair legal framework, development of education, and 
development of the Somali language. As with British Somaliland, the “resistance” 
movement from the local people, in this case the movement of SYL was conducted 
within the clan framework and gained many supporters. SYL stimulated Somali 
nationalism here (Africa Japan Forum, 2006). 
 
2.5.2 Independence 
 
After World War II, many countries gained their independence including many in Africa. 
On 26th June 1960, British Somaliland became independent of Britain and called itself 
the Republic of Somaliland. Five days later, on 1st July 1960, ex Italian-Somaliland 
which was a trust territory under UN after the defeat of Italy in World War II, became 
independent and merged with Somaliland to become the Somali Republic (BBC News, 
2016a). Actually, the Republic of Somaliland disappeared only five days after its birth.  
 
The Somali Republic was established by the merging of two countries, British 
Somaliland and the Trust Territory Somaliland (ex-Italian Somaliland) under the name 
of great Somalia. Consequently, Pan-Somalism was one of the most important 
policies of the government. The government of Somali Republic tried to gain the 
support of African countries to achieve the great Somalia. However, this was difficult. 
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On June 1963, Kenya became independent from the Britain. Subsequently the 
nationality of the north-eastern region known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) 
was discussed between Kenya and Somalia. Since the NFD was historically a Somali 
residential area, and the percentage of Somali in the population at the time was more 
than 60%, there was a basis for possible Somali nationality. However, Britain decided 
that NFD to be a part of Kenya regardless of the will of the people. This decision made 
the establishment of the great Somalia even more difficult. Moreover, African countries 
were afraid of the influence of Pan-Somalism on the determination of borders of 
sovereign states in Africa. Consequently, the government of Somali Republic could 
not gain the support of other African countries, and became increasingly isolated. In 
addition, inside the government, clan-based nepotism and corruption took root. 
Popular discontent with the government consistently increased. The person who 
significantly changed this situation was Muhammad Siad Barre (Endo, 2015). 
 
2.5.3 Muhammad Siad Barre Regime 
 
After the assassination of the second president, General Muhammad Siad Barre 
seized power in a bloodless military coup in 1969. The name of country was changed 
to the Somali Democratic Republic. The Muhammad Siad Barre regime continued for 
twenty years. Under this regime, specific clans were given favorable treatment, while 
some other clans were treated coldly or oppressed in contradiction with the regimes 
formal policy. In particular, the Isaaq and Majeerteen clans were strongly oppressed 
(Endo, 2015). These despotic oppressions significantly increased people's discontent 
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(Elmi & Barise, 2006). 
 
Because of the defeat of the Ogaden war (1977 – 1978) against Ethiopia, the power 
of the Siad Barre regime was weakened. Consequently, the anti-government 
movement in Somalia briskly increased. In 1979, the first resistance movement, 
Somali Salvation Front (SSF) was established by the Majeerteen people. SSF 
changed its name to Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and merged with two 
smaller anti-governmental groups in 1981 (INS Resource Information Center, 1993). 
In 1981, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was formed by the Isaaq people. In 
addition, the Hawiye people formed the United Somali Congress (USC) and started 
an anti-government movement (Terdman, 2008). Against these anti-government 
movements, the Siad Barre regime strongly retaliated. In particular the northern 
region occupied by SNM was severely bombed, and Hargeisa, the capital of the state, 
was ruined completely with tens thousands killed (The East African, 2016). However, 
the anti-government resistance further weakened the Siad Barre regime. Ultimately, 
on 26th January 1991, a USC army led by General Mohamed Farrah Aideed occupied 
Mogadishu, and the Siad Barre regime was overthrown (Country Information & Policy 
Unit, 2004). 
 
2.5.4 South Central Somalia after Siad Barre Regime 
 
After the USC brought Mogadishu under its control and overthrew the Siad Barre 
regime, it declared the establishment of a new government. However, USC was split 
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into two groups, and started fighting to establish a hegemony. South Central Somalia 
entered period of anarchy. About ten years later, the Somalia Transitional National 
Government (TNG) was established in 2000 through peace conferences. However, 
TNG could not gain any advantage over the hegemony. Later, in 2004, the Somalia 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established, and fought against Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU) over the hegemony and succeeded in putting a major part of 
South Central Somalia including Mogadishu under its control (U.S. Department of 
State & Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). Finally, in 2012 TFG finished its 
transitional period, and officially the Federal Republic of Somalia was established. 
Today, South Central Somalia is under the control of the government of the Federal 
Republic of Somalia; the period of anarchy is over. However, Al-Shabaab, a violent 
extremist group split from ICU, is still conducting many terrorist attacks (Endo, 2015). 
 
2.5.5 Somaliland 
 
When the Siad Barre regime collapsed, the SNM declared independence for the 
Republic of Somaliland in the North West Somalia, which was the territory of the 
British Somaliland on 18th May 1991. At present, one of the biggest issues preventing 
the recognition by UN of this declaration of the independence of Somaliland is the 
unofficial rule that prohibits the change of African colonial borders (Fisher, 2012). 
Against this issue, Somaliland has insisted its lawfulness based on the border fixed 
on 26th July 1960, and which existed for five days (Somalilandlaw.com, n.d.). 
Somaliland has however, still not been recognized as an independent country by the 
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UN. Despite this, so far, there is currently relative political stability, democracy, and 
public security (Hesse, 2011). 
 
2.5.6 Puntland 
 
After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime, SSDF tried to secure a safe and stable 
area in North East Somalia. Consequently, SSDF formed the Puntland State of 
Somalia in 1998. While the South Central Somalia entered a period of anarchy as 
stated earlier, this autonomous region established its democracy and was relatively 
stable, though there were many problems including piracy, clan based conflicts, and 
security issues (Johnson & Smaker, 2014). Puntland maintained better governance 
condition than pertained in South Central Somalia. 
 
2.6 Current Situation of the Three Regions in Somalia 
 
As mentioned previously, current Somalia can be divided in the three regions, South 
Central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. They are governed by different 
“governments”. Naturally, the current diversity of the different regions means that the 
pros and cons for the provision of the seafarers are different. Therefore, a review of 
the current situation of these regions for developing seafarer training and education 
is essential for this research. 
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2.6.1 South and Central Somalia 
 
In South Central Somalia, there has been a formal government recognized by UN 
since 2012. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recognized the federal 
government of Somalia formally in 2013. In addition, IMF launched a Multi Donor Trust 
Fund (MDTF) in 2015. For this fund, some organizations, such as the Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development, the Canadian Department for Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Development, and the United Kingdom's Department for International 
Development, have decided to contribute: and the IMF is still collecting more 
contributions. Over nine million dollars will be budgeted by 2018 to assist the 
improvement of the macroeconomic system in Somalia (IMF Communication 
Department, 2015). Thus, due to the international recognition since 2012, South 
Central Somalia is open to the contributions of and collaboration with other countries 
and foreign companies. This could be an advantage to launch the seafarer training in 
this region. 
 
In South Central Somalia, a good security situation has not yet been established. 
Establishment of the formal government in 2012 was a key step, but it did not lead to 
the instant realization of peace. South Central Somalia is still under a state of a civil 
war. The Somali National Army (SNA), a regular army of the Federal Republic of 
Somalia, and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is engaged in severe 
fighting against the Al-Shabaab. The power of the Al-Shabaab has been weakened 
compared with years ago. However, Al-Shabaab still keeps approximately 7,000 to 
 34 
 
9,000 soldiers and some areas in the South Central Somalia are still under their 
control (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Even areas under the control of the federal 
government are always threatened by invasions or terrorist attacks by the Al-Shabaab 
(BBC News, 2015). For example, more than 50 soldiers were killed by Al-Shabaab 
near Mogadishu on 26th June 2015. An AMISOM's base in Janale was attacked by 
Al-Shabaab and more than 20 persons were killed on 1st September 2015. In 2016 
also, there were multiple terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab; and more than 100 people 
were killed (BBC News, 2016b). Their targets are not only soldiers, but also civilians 
including people working for non-governmental organizations (NGO), the UN, and 
diplomatic missions. Al-Shabaab is seriously threatening the security of South Central 
Somalia. On the other hand, agencies of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) 
which maintain public security, such as SNA and the police have some problems 
themselves. Their sense of belonging to the clan is generally stronger than the 
identification with the FGS (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Therefore, they often do 
their security work with more focus on their clan (IRIN, 2014). This could make them 
almost a “private army” of the clan and especially when a conflict among the clans 
arises, their greater allegiance to the clan could lead to abuse of the security power. 
Moreover, the Somali National Army (SNA) has been known to have setup illegal 
check points and imposed a toll on civilians at least until 2015 (U.S. Department of 
State, 2016). The weak loyalty to the government and abuse of the security power 
worsens the security situation of South Central Somalia. 
 
 35 
 
2.6.2 Puntland 
 
Puntland is not insisting on independence from Somalia. As the name "Puntland State 
of Somalia" suggests, they view their position as being a part of the Federal Republic 
of Somalia. Therefore, as a part of UN recognized country Puntland can have access 
to the international society. Accordingly, as the formal central government, FGS was 
established in 2012, and the international organizations, such as IMF started funding 
to the Federal Republic Somalia, Puntland also could increase its accessibility to the 
international fund. Moreover, Puntland government maintained its stability even in the 
absence of the central government (Murphy, 2011). When South Central Somalia was 
in anarchy, Puntland still maintained its territory in order, and even maintained the 
democratic mechanisms such as elections (Puntland Development Research Center, 
2015). Accessibility to the international society, stable government, and democracy, 
could be the positive factors to launch the seafarer training. 
 
However, the international recognition of Puntland exists only to the point that it is 
seen as a part of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The Puntland government itself 
has not recognized formally by the international society. Access to the international 
grants and loans is thus still limited. Because of the lack of major industries, most of 
revenue of Puntland relies on port revenue; and most of this revenue is used for the 
maintenance of the administration, police, and military (Johnson & Smaker, 2014). 
 
Puntland has a stable government, but still there are some problems that affect its 
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stability, such as conflict between Somaliland, and poor public security. Somaliland 
declared its independence in 1991, and determined its territory following the area 
which was British Somaliland. The independence movement was led by the SNM 
consisting of Isaaq people, but the territory of the British Somaliland includes other 
clan people's residential areas. In the eastern part of Somaliland, for example, the 
majority of people belong to the Darood clan. On the other hand, Puntland has not 
recognized the independence of Somaliland. Puntland, regarding Somaliland as just 
an Isaaq residential area, decided to set its territory over the Darood residential area 
including part of British Somaliland. This has generated ongoing conflict over the 
territory between Somaliland and Puntland since their origin (Mesfin, 2009). Moreover, 
public security inside Puntland is not secure regardless of this conflict with Somaliland. 
In the worst period of Somali piracy, many piratical businesses were established and 
conducted in this region (Endo, 2015). It was even suspected that there was a 
beneficial relationship between governmental officers and Somali pirates (Murphy, 
2011). In addition, Al-Shabaab having lost its southern territory after 2012, is 
threatening the security situation (Endo, 2015). Limited access to the international 
society, conflict between Somaliland, and poor public security - these are serious 
problems preventing Puntland stability and development. 
 
2.6.3 Somaliland 
 
First of all, public security in Somaliland is much better than other regions in Somalia. 
It is not temporary security, but Somaliland has maintained the peace over the 
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decades (Hesse, 2011). After the declaration of independence of the Republic of 
Somaliland in 1991, clan-based civil wars happened many times. However, since the 
Hargeisa conference, a peace conference held in the capital of Somaliland, in 1996, 
unity of the people, democratization, and disarmament proceeded with certainty and 
peacefully (Endo, 2015). There has been no civil war inside Somaliland since the 
Hargeisa conference. On the other hand, as Al-Shabaab gained power in the South, 
Somaliland was also exposed to its threat. On 29th October 2008, synchronized 
terrorist attacks happened in Hargeisa (Somaliland), and in Bosaso (Puntland). At 
least 30 people were killed by these attacks (McKenzie & Adow, 2008). However, 
because of the reinforcement of the maintenance of public security after the attacks 
and deterioration of the power of Al-Shabaab, Somaliland has not had any terrorist 
attack for eight years. Security situation in Somaliland has been secured to a degree. 
 
Somaliland has developed its own democracy since the declaration of the 
independence in 1991. Somaliland has bicameral legislature consisting of the House 
of Elders (Guurti) and the House of Representatives. The House of Elders consists of 
eighty-two traditional leaders, and the House of Representatives consists of eighty-
two members elected through democratic election (United Kingdom Home Office, 
2013). Furthermore, the President of Somaliland is elected through direct elections. 
Politics in Somaliland has shifted from clan to individual. There are, however, 
difficulties and doubts regarding the fairness of elections. Because of some of the 
people's nomadic life style, registration of voters is particularly difficult, and it could be 
used as the excuse for the delay of elections. However, some occurrences, such as 
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the election as president of an individual belonging to a minority clan, and the change 
of government through the elections in 2010, prove that democracy exists in 
Somaliland to a degree (Johnson & Smaker, 2014). 
 
In Berbera, the main port of Somaliland, there is a maritime academy named Berbera 
Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA) established in 2012. BMFA provides a 
Bachelor degree program in Marine Engineering, Nautical Science, and Fishery as 
the only MET institute in Somaliland. They do not have enough facilities or human 
resource yet. They do not have any latest ship simulator, and enough numbers of 
lecturers. However, they are - with these limited resources - producing seafarers to 
the shipping industry every year. Furthermore, they are trying to establish 
relationships with foreign organizations. For example, BMFA and World Maritime 
University (WMU) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2014. There 
exists a basis for developing MET (World Maritime University, 2014). 
 
The biggest problem of Somaliland is that they are not recognized by the international 
society. It makes it difficult to access the international community, be funded by foreign 
organizations, and engage in international shipping. In the UN view, Somaliland is just 
a part of the Federal Republic of Somalia. However, the desire for international 
recognition has enhanced the development of Somaliland (Johnson & Smaker, 2014). 
Gaining the recognition is "the number one priority" (Somaliland Government, n.d.) 
for them. Somaliland people have made great efforts to be recognized by the 
international society; improved public security, enhanced democratization, and 
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developed their economy (Johnson & Smaker, 2014). To achieve the number one 
priority, Somaliland will keep making efforts and developing themselves. 
 
As mentioned previously, there is a disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland 
(see figure 4). The major clan in Somaliland is the Isaaq; and the most major clan in 
Puntland is the Majeerteen. Somaliland insists its territory is based on the territory of 
the British Somaliland, including the residential areas of Warsangeli and Dhulbahante 
clan (see figure 5 and figure 6). However, Puntland has not recognized the 
independence of Somaliland. Moreover, Puntland regards Somaliland just as a 
residential area of the Isaaq clan. Therefore, in the context of Puntland, the residential 
areas of Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clan should not be included in Somaliland. On 
the other hand, the Puntland government defines itself as the community of Harti clan-
collective. Majeerteen, Warsangeli, and Dhulbahante clan, all of them belong to Harti 
clan-collective. Accordingly, Puntland is insisting its territory is based on the residential 
areas of Harti, including the residential areas of the Warsangeli and Dhulbahante 
clans. However, Somaliland regards Puntland as a community of the Majeerteen. 
Consequently, the residential areas of Warsangeli and Dhulbahante clans are still 
under dispute between Somaliland and Puntland. This is a quite sensitive problem 
which could lead to military conflict; and could reduce the stability in Somaliland 
(Mesfin, 2009; Endo, 2015). 
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Figure 4: Disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland 
Source: Gagale, I. H. (2015, June 16). Somaliland Puntland Disputed [Map]. In Somaliland: 
Focus on Border Dispute with Puntland. Retrieved August 30, 2016, from 
http://www.somalilandsun.com/contact-us/36-in-depth/in-depth/7580-somaliland-focus-on-
border-dispute-with-puntland 
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Figure 5: Colonial Borders 
Source: Center for Justice and Accountability. (n.d.). Somalia Colonial Map [Map]. In 
SOMALIA: COLONIAL LEGACY. Retrieved August 30, 2016, from http://cja.org/where-we-
work/somalia/related-resources/somalia-colonial-legacy/ 
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Figure 6: Traditional Residential Area of Somali Clan 
Source: United States Central Intelligence Agency. (2012) Somalia Country Profile. 
[Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency] [Map] Retrieved from the Library of 
Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2012594293/. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this research is to analyze the feasibility of developing a sustainable supply 
of Somali seafarers, and the effect this could have as a deterrent to sustainably 
avoiding the resurgence of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The research methodology 
described was aimed at answering the following questions: 
 Could the sustainable development of Somali seafarers be a deterrent to the 
Somali piracy? 
 Do the Somali people have an interest in developing the Somali seafarers for 
employment in the international shipping industry? 
 Do shipping companies have an interest in employing Somali seafarers? 
The mixed method approach was used to answer those research questions. In this 
chapter, the research methodology and associated approaches and methods are 
discussed. It includes a discussion of the selection of research participants, the 
research instruments used and how data was collected and analyzed. 
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3.2 Selection of Participants 
3.2.1 Shipping Company 
 
According to the Cabinet Secretariat of Japan (2015) approximately 1,700 Japan 
related vessels sailed through the Gulf of Aden in 2014. This means about 10% of 
vessels passing through the Gulf of Aden was owned/managed by Japanese shipping 
companies. Therefore, to interrogate the interest level of shipping companies in 
employing Somali seafarers, workers of selected Japanese shipping company 
operating ships off the coast of Somalia were targeted as participants in the research. 
Moreover, to examine the relationship between the level of interest to employ Somali 
seafarers and the ability of such employment to act as a deterrent to Somali piracy, 
the participants were selected from only the shipping company operating the ships off 
the coast of Somalia. 
 
3.2.2 Location - Comparison of Three Regions in Somalia 
 
Considering the current situation reviewed in previous chapter, South Central Somalia, 
Puntland, and Somaliland have different pros and cons with respect to the 
development of MET. To select the most adequate region to develop seafarer training 
and education, four aspects, access to the international loan, political stability, 
democratic situation, and public security will be compared. 
 
First of all, access to the international loan. South Central Somalia has a formal 
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government recognized internationally. Therefore, they have good access to the 
international loan, such as IMF. Puntland is recognized internationally as part of the 
Federal Republic of Somalia, but not as a government itself. Therefore, access to the 
international loan is limited compared with South Central Somalia. Somaliland has no 
international recognition. Therefore, access to the international loan is quite limited, 
but efforts to gain such access have been made continuously. 
 
Secondly, political stability. In South Central Somalia there has been a formal federal 
government since 2012, but this is still relatively new. Political stability is poor, or at 
least difficult to expect. Puntland and Somaliland have maintained their stable 
government. 
 
Thirdly, democratic situation. Somalia Federal Government (SFG) is quite new; 
therefore, they have not developed certain democratic systems, such as democratic 
elections and a constitution. Puntland has developed its own democracy. However, it 
is still a clan-based system. Somaliland has developed its own democracy, and the 
change of government was done through the election. 
 
Finally, Public security. In South Central Somalia, there is poor public security. Many 
terrorist attacks are conducted up till now. Moreover, the police and military are not 
organized strictly and their allegiance to the State is questionable. In Puntland, conflict 
with Somaliland, threat of terrorism, and piracy exist. These factors lower the level of 
public security. Somaliland has conflict with Puntland, but disarmament of civilians 
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has been completed, and there is a greater likelihood that public security will be 
successfully maintained (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Pros and Cons in each region 
 
“○” indicates “good”, △ indicates “average”, and “×” indicates “poor” 
 
Considering the comparison of the four factors between the three regions, Somaliland 
seems to have the most positive factors for developing the seafarer training and 
education. Consequently, Somaliland was selected as the place to conduct this 
research. 
 
3.3 Instrumentation 
 
To collect the data about specific issues of interest, the use of questionnaires is one 
of the more simple instruments available (Kirklees Council, n.d.-b). Interviewing is 
however, a research instrument which is used to know and understand people's 
feelings, perceptions and experiences and to research new topics particularly where 
existing data is limited (Kirklees Council, n.d.-a). In this research, questionnaires were 
used to know the current situation and interest level of the participants. Interviews 
were conducted to know the experiences and various opinions of the participants. 
South Central
Somalia
Puntland Somaliland
Access to International Loan ○ △ △
Political Stability × ○ ○
Democracic Situation × △ ○
Public Security × △ ○
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Especially for the research about the Somali people, interviewing was decided to be 
the most beneficial research instrument considering the relatively small numbers in 
the sample. Consequently, two electronic questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews were constructed as research instruments. 
 
3.4 Research Ethics 
 
Every research instruments used for this research was approved by the WMU 
Research Ethic Committee. All respondents of the interview consented to being 
interviewed and for the use the contents of the interview for the research. All 
respondents were assured that private information collected through the research 
instruments would be treated completely confidentially, and data collected are to be 
used only for academic purposes. 
 
3.5 Questionnaire Instrument 
 
Two types of electronic questionnaires were prepared. One was designed to be 
answered by workers in shipping companies, and another for the students of Berbera 
Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA) located in Somaliland. The questionnaire 
for shipping company consisted of twelve items in the form of multiple choice 
questions, (either by checkbox or dropdown menus, or open/free comment. The 
questionnaire for BMFA students consisted of thirteen items required multiple choice, 
checkbox, or free comment. All of them were sent to the respondents by email. 
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3.6 Interview Instrument 
 
The semi-structured interviews were prepared for faculty of BMFA and governmental 
officials in ministries. The questions for the interview were constructed to ask the 
opinions about current and future MET in Somaliland, generic characteristics of the 
Somali seafarer, interest in the provision of seafarers to the international shipping, 
and potential impact of the existence of maritime education and training in Somali on 
the continuation or otherwise of piracy. All interviews were conducted in English, and 
in person (by the researcher) on site in Somaliland. 
 
3.7 Data Collection 
3.7.1 Quantitative Method 
 
As quantitative research instruments, two questionnaires were constructed. One was 
for shipping companies, and the other for the students of the maritime academy in 
Somaliland. The questionnaire for the shipping companies was distributed to the 
workers of multiple Japanese shipping companies by email. It was distributed to more 
than thirty persons, and ten answers were sent back (a response rate of 30%). The 
questionnaire to the students of maritime academies was conducted with the 
cooperation of BMFA, the only MET institute in Somaliland. Through the faculty of 
BMFA, the questionnaire was distributed to the students. However, it was the time for 
the summer vacation for the students, and they were not in the academy. 
Nevertheless, eleven answers were sent back. Receiving answers to the 
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questionnaires was closed on August 20, 2016 12:00, due to time limitation. The 
answers of questionnaires were compiled by google form automatically. 
 
3.7.2 Qualitative Method 
 
As qualitative research instrument, semi-structured interviews were conducted. Some 
members of faculty of BMFA and governmental officers of the ministries were 
approached as interviewees. Faculty, students and graduates of BMFA, an executive 
of Somaliland Counter Piracy Coordination (CPC) Office, the General Manager of a 
Shipping and Multi-Service Agency, officers of the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine 
Resource, officers of Berbera Port Authority, and seafarers in Berbera port 
participated as interviewees. All interviews were conducted in Somaliland between 
July 26 and July 29, 2016, by the researcher in person. 
 
3.8 Data Analysis 
3.8.1 Quantitative Analysis 
 
Quantitative analysis of the data from questionnaires responses was mainly done 
using descriptive statistics and presented in pie charts, tables, and graphs. They were 
used to validate/augment the findings from the qualitative analysis. Graphics for 
descriptive statistics were generated from Google Form. 
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3.8.2 Qualitative Analysis 
 
A qualitative analysis software "ATLAS.ti" was used to analyze the transcribed 
interviews and open comments from the questionnaires. Transcribed interviews and 
questionnaires were coded and analyzed on a comparative basis. 
 
3.9 Summary 
 
The objective of the methods chosen was to know the shipping company's anti-piracy 
measures and prospective employment of African seafarers including Somali, interest 
level of the Somali people for engaging in international shipping, and deterrent to the 
piracy of having Somali seafarers on-board. The mixed method approach (with an 
emphasis on the qualitative side) was deemed suitable to analyze the collected data. 
In the next chapter, findings and results of the data are presented. 
  
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Presentation and Analysis of Data 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, analyses of the responses obtained from the research instruments - 
interviews and electronic questionnaires - is presented, together with the findings. 
First of all, the analyses of responses obtained from the interviews conducted in 
Somaliland, and from the questionnaire to students of the Berbera Maritime and 
Fisheries Academy (BMFA) are presented. Subsequently, the analyses of the 
responses from the questionnaire to the shipping companies will be presented. 
 
4.2 Interview in Somaliland and Questionnaire for BMFA 
4.2.1 Characteristics of Somali people 
 
Stereotypical labeling of the characteristics of the people in specific ethnic groups and 
nationalities can be dangerous, annoying, and harmful (Lambert, 2014). Decision- 
making based on stereotypes can lead to failure at a minimum. However, knowing 
how the people in specific groups generally think or feel about themselves compared 
with others could be productive when carefully done. In the interviews all persons who 
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were asked about the strength of Somali seafarers mentioned that Somali people are 
hard workers. The following analysis and discussion contain direct quotes from the 
interviews (verbatim).  
 
Graduates of Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA) 
"We work hard". 
 
Faculty of BMFA 
"We are hardworking people". 
"Hard workers, they work very hard even if the salary is less". 
"They are hard workers, polite, acceptable for any working pressure, friendly to  
colleagues and open minded". 
"Somali seafarers are good in character and hard workers, honest, very patient 
In the job, so it’s good for international companies to hire this kind of people". 
 
Somali sailor 
"We work hard". 
 
Egyptian deck officer 
"They are hardworking people, and obey orders well". 
 
Governmental officer of the Ministry of Fisheries 
"Somali people work very hard, and they are low cost labor force (for the  
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international shipping companies)". 
 
Obviously, many Somali people (as represented by those interviewed) believe that 
they are "hard workers". In addition, a non-Somali person, an Egyptian deck officer, 
who was working with Somali ratings also mentioned the diligence of Somali ratings. 
Actually, persons who visit Somaliland would notice that staffs engaged in the service 
industry, such as hotel staffs and restaurant staffs, work busily and diligently. 
 
On the other hand, some respondents of the interview mentioned the inflexibility and 
limited level of tolerance as a weakness of Somali seafarers. 
 
Faculty of BMFA 
"They are hard workers, but it is difficult for Somali people to tolerate injustice". 
"They are very hot in blood. They can’t take any violation. If they saw any abuse,  
they immediately react". 
 
Somali sailor 
"When they felt that they were betrayed by someone, they fight. But because of  
experiences it is getting better". 
 
They said that Somali people cannot overlook injustice, and this could lead to conflict 
between them and others. If conflict happens often on-board due to this characteristic, 
it could be a problem for international shipping companies. However, one respondent 
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in discussing "injustice" noted the following: 
 
Faculty of BMFA 
"(sometimes the origin of "injustice" is) less understanding to the foreign cultures,  
because they do not have many chance to meet foreigners". 
 
Poor public security due to the civil wars, absence of a dominant central government 
and piracy have kept away foreigners from Somalia. Therefore, there has not been 
much opportunity for the people of Somalia to learn about foreign cultures. As a result, 
conflict between them and foreigners could arise because of cultural 
misunderstandings. However, as the Somali sailor also indicated "because of 
experiences, it is getting better". The situation could be ameliorated as they learn. In 
addition to this issue of culture, one respondent noted another possible causative 
factor for a perception of "injustice" as follows: 
 
Faculty of BMFA 
"Misunderstanding for the others because of language problem". 
 
Language barrier seems to one of the biggest challenges for Somali seafarers, even 
in the Somaliland. Actually multiple respondents mentioned this language issue. 
 
Faculty of BMFA 
(What are the challenges to a young person in Somaliland to pursue MET in  
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BMFA?) "Language barrier". 
(What is the weakness of Somali seafarers?) "Language barrier". 
 
Egyptian deck officer 
(What is the weakness of Somali seafarers?) "English". 
 
Governmental officer of the Ministry of Fisheries 
(What kind of factors would be needed to improve on the provision of Somali  
seafarers to the international shipping companies from Somaliland, and make  
sure of its sustainability?) "Education and training including language". 
 
If the origins of the perceptions of injustice that Somali seafarers feel is mainly based 
on the language issues, it could be improved by English training. A BMFA faculty who 
indicated language issue also mentioned that they were good language learners. 
 
4.2.2 Deterrent to the Piracy 
 
It is difficult for the shipping companies to employ seafarers from all over the world. 
To engage in international shipping significantly, it would be better for any potential 
labor-supplying State to have a selling point to make it appealing for potential 
employers. If the existence of Somali seafarer on-board could be a deterrent to the 
Somali piracy, that would constitute such a strong point. 
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Could the existence of Somali seafarer on-board affect piracy off the coast of 
Somalia? To this question, all respondents answered "Yes"; and piracy off the coast 
of Somalia will decrease because of it. For example, some respondents mentioned 
as following: 
 
Graduate of BMFA 
"Pirates will hesitate to attack the ship". 
 
Student of BMFA 
"This (existence of Somali seafarers on-board) will reduce the risk of piracy". 
 
Egyptian deck officer 
"The pirates will hesitate to attack Somali seafarers, if they realized it they would  
stop attacking the ship". 
 
It is noteworthy that two reasons were given for why Somali seafarers could be a 
deterrent. The first was the identical ethnic group they belong to - "Somali" - and 
secondly the clan-based structure of Somali society. 
 
Graduate of BMFA 
"(Piracy will decrease because) Somali seafarers know Somali pirates, Somali  
knows Somali". 
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Faculty of BMFA 
"Generally, for Somali people, it is easy to identify Somali pirates. So if Somali  
pirates attack Somali seafarer, it could lead to clan conflict". 
"Usually Somali pirates do not attack Somali, but only foreigners". 
"Somali people, they know each other, so if the pirates saw any Somali on the  
ship, they will leave". 
 
Manager of the Shipping & Multi-service Agency in Somaliland 
"It will decrease, because if they have same nationality they will be afraid.  
Somali cannot attack Somali - each other". 
 
"Somali knows Somali". As these words suggest, the deep relationships among 
Somali people based on clan-based structure of Somali society could be the deterrent 
to the piracy. 
 
To underpin this idea, some respondents mentioned some precedents or their 
experiences. 
 
Faculty of BMFA 
"There is an example, many Somali ships record and announce that they are  
Somali ships in Somali language to avoid piracy". 
"(as far as I know) The graduates of BMFA never had piratical attack before,  
because pirates knew there were Somali".  
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Somali sailor 
"I have never had any piratical attack in my career, because Somali seafarers  
can be the deterrent to the piracy. 100% they have some influence to the pirates". 
 
Secondly, some respondents mentioned its deterrent as an employment measure. 
 
Graduate of BMFA 
"(for some Somali people) piracy is the only way to get money from the sea, but  
if they could be seafarers, they would stop (piracy). Then all Somali pirates  
would be removed from the sea". 
 
Executive of the Somaliland Counter Piracy Coordination (CPC) Office  
"If the young people got the opportunity to go to the sea, it could be the deterrent.  
(If they can be employed as seafarer) why would they become pirates?" 
 
Unemployment leads to poverty, and poverty has the potential of creating criminals. 
There is causal relation between these two variables (Berrebi, 2015). People who are 
suffering from poverty could become pirates in Somalia. Thus, increasing the 
employability of Somali seafarers could be a solution for this piratical problem. Some 
respondents did indeed mention the role and potential of seafarer training as an 
employment measure. 
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Faculty of BMFA 
"(in BMFA) Rate of employment after graduation is high". 
"This knowledge (about seafaring) is very rare in our country (Somaliland) and  
we have a long coast line. And we have a big port which is used every year by  
more than 10,000 ships. These ships need to get crew and seafarers. So our  
students more likely to get job than any other graduates from other universities  
in Somaliland".  
"(in BMFA) Easy to get the chance of employment compare with other schools". 
 
4.2.3 Interest level to engage in the international shipping 
 
If the Somali people are not interested in engaging in more significant ways in the 
international shipping, then it would be perhaps futile to continue discussing the issue, 
irrespective of whether they have good characteristics for seafarers or whether 
optimized MET would be a good intervention as a deterrent to piracy. However, if they 
have great interest in working at sea in an international context, then the discussion 
is worth pursuing. Motivation is one of the most important factors to achieve anything 
especially when it is intrinsic (The communication toolbox, n.d.). 
 
Analyses of responses to the research instruments suggest that such an interest does 
exist. From the questionnaire for the BMFA students it was found that more than 90% 
of the students who answered the questionnaire (ten of eleven) answered that they 
were interested in working for the international shipping company (see figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Interest in seafaring (BMFA students) 
 
Moreover, 70% of the respondents who answered indicated that they were interested 
in working for the international shipping company and rated their interest at the highest 
level (see figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8: Interest level of the BMFA students 
 
It is noteworthy that students who have sea experience tended to have higher interest. 
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Actually, five of six respondents who have sea experience rated their interest at the 
highest level, and the other respondent rated it at the second highest level. Thus, 
most of the students of the maritime academy are significantly interested in engaging 
in the international shipping as seafarers. Moreover, after having sea experience their 
interest level to tended to be higher. This could be inferred to suggest that there would 
be the low turnover rates after employment. 
 
Respondents who chose the highest interest level explained the reasons for the 
expressing that level of interest high interest level as follows: 
 
"First, I like the life of sea. Second, I need to further may career. Third to get  
experience. And finally, to get more income". 
"To get experience and income". 
"(because) It is my favorite subject". 
"I like sea going jobs. I want to be one of Somali experts in this field". 
"To get more experience, to know a lot of countries in the world, and to get  
enough salary". 
"To be the first Somalilander who reached this rank, to gain knowledge,  
experiences, money, respect, famous etc." 
 
A desire to learn more about the oceans and the world, and earning a relatively high 
salary are motivating the young Somali people to engage in international shipping. In 
addition, some of them are of the opinion that it would be make them more respectable. 
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These are the reasons for the high interest level and motivation of the young Somali 
people. 
 
From the interviews done with the persons working for the maritime industry, all 
respondents indicated positive sentiments about providing Somali seafarers to the 
international shipping company. 
 
Graduates of Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA) 
"It is good. Because it will increase bilateral relationships between Somaliland  
and other countries".  
"It is good for young people, because they will get more chance to be employed,  
and they would have good experiences". 
"It is good for Somaliland and BMFA. Because, it could be the connection  
between them and the international shipping. Next generation Somaliland  
people could get more experiences and employment". 
"(It is good because) Somaliland people would get more income and information  
of the world". 
"Somaliland could improve the relationship between Somaliland and  
international society". 
 
Governmental officer of the Ministry of Fisheries 
"100% agree, because it would create new job opportunities for young people". 
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In addition to the mentioning of inquiring mind and high salary as reasons for the 
significant interest of the young Somali people (BMFA students), respondents who 
were already employed in the maritime industry also mention “national interest”. 
Gaining recognition from the international society is the earnest wish of the 
Somaliland (Republic of Somaliland, Ministry of National Planning and Development, 
2011). They are hoping for the establishment of good relationships between the 
international society and Somaliland through shipping. It could be a great motivation 
not only for the individuals in Somaliland but for the Somaliland government. 
Furthermore, they are expecting the creation of new employment opportunities, and 
new knowledge and information for the next generation. Human resource 
development would enhance the development of the country. It also would motivate 
the people and the government. 
 
4.2.4 Feasibility 
 
As mentioned previously, it is obvious that the Somaliland people, maritime 
organizations, and the government would be interested in the improved provision of 
the seafarers to international shipping companies. However, to launch the project in 
practice, it has to be feasible. Respondents in Somaliland mentioned about its 
feasibility as follows: 
 
Student of BMFA 
"it is possible and it needs only to work closely the academy with the  
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international companies which have liner for Berbera port. Young Somaliland  
seafarers will get from these international shipping knowledge, experience and  
jobs". 
"It is possible, if we got support from developed countries like Japan to  
encourage their companies to take students and seafarers from Somaliland.  
The other main important issue is to support the BMFA to produce good quality  
students capable to work on the big ships of developed countries have". 
"It is possible, but first we have to develop and equip BMFA as learning center.  
It needs a lot of things, such as twinning university, foreign lecturers, facilities  
and acceptable certificate". 
"Yes (providing seafarers to the international shipping is good), we have a lot of  
opportunities to be part of international seafarer. First, we have a long coast,  
ports, and international ships that use our ports, but unfortunately our  
government does not know how to request international shipping companies to  
carry Somaliland seafarer as crew or as cadets". 
"(It is) not possible, because we do not have any recognition from international  
countries". 
 
More than half of the respondents from BMFA students answered that it was feasible, 
but there were two negative answers as well. The reason for the negative answers is 
based on the issue that Somaliland does not have any formal recognition from the 
international society. Moreover, even the many of students who answered that it was 
feasible, mentioned the necessity of the assistance from outside. 
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However, some respondents also mentioned some positive facts in the interview. 
 
Faculty of BMFA 
"A lot of Somali seamen work (on ships) abroad traditionally." 
"Our first graduates were fifty-one students, twenty-one of them are working now  
on the international ships, like MSC (Mediterranean Shipping Company), IMSS  
(International Maritime Shipping Services), Maersk Line, and Saudi livestock  
ships." 
 
Somali sailor 
"They (Somali seafarers) are very competent in the tanker field, because of a  
lot of experience. Many tankers sail off the coast of Somalia." 
 
Manager of the Shipping & Multi-service Agency 
"I think it is possible, because we have enough seafarers, engineers, and ratings.  
Also good teachers and training include one-year training in sea service." 
 
Governmental officer of the Ministry of Fisheries 
"Somali is everywhere in the world." 
 
Numerous Somali people are diasporic in many places in the world, adapting 
successfully to each place. This is seen as a positive factor. Moreover, providing 
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seafarers to the international shipping is not a completely new challenge for Somali 
people. They are already providing seafarers from BMFA to shipping companies 
including those trading internationally around Somalia. In fact, 36% of BMFA students 
who responded the questionnaire (four of eleven) answered that they have been given 
informal assurances of employment after graduation, from shipping companies; and 
half of such companies are engaged in the international shipping (see figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9: Employment after graduate BMFA 
 
In addition, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Academic Cooperation was 
signed between BMFA and the World Maritime University (WMU) in 2014 (World 
Maritime University, 2014). The door granting access to the international community 
is not closed completely for Somali people. Improving the employability of the Somali 
seafarer need not start from scratch. 
 
 67 
 
4.3 Questionnaire for shipping company 
4.3.1 Counter measures to piracy off the coast of Somalia 
 
According to the answers received from the questionnaire to the shipping companies, 
all shipping companies are executing multiple counter measures when sailing off the 
coast of Somalia, even in the current situation where piratical attacks off the coast of 
Somalia have substantially reduced1 . Despite the reduction, shipping companies 
appear to recognize that the fall in piratical attacks may be short-term and that the 
waters off Somalia may still be dangerous. 90% of the shipping companies who 
answered the questionnaire still sail their ships under naval protection, and 70% of 
the respondents hire armed security guards as counter measures to piracy. All 
respondents indicated that their companies adopt at least one of these measures (see 
figure 10). 
                                                   
1 Number of actual and attempted attacks attributed Somali pirates decreased from 200 in 
2011 to 0 in 2015 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2016). 
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Figure 10: Counter measures to the piracy off the coast of Somalia 
 
Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been reduced mainly by the use of military power. 
This is not inexpensive. Half of the respondents indicated that they are spending more 
than one million USD per year (see figure 11). 
 
Sail under  
naval 
protection 
Hire armed  
security 
guards  
on-board 
Sailing with  
high speed 
Other 
Re-routeing 
 69 
 
 
Figure 11: Annual cost for the counter measures to the piracy 
 
Counter measures to the piracy are very expensive. 
 
4.3.2 Employing African Seafarers and Employing Somali Seafarers 
 
As indicated earlier, a questionnaire was sent to multiple Japanese shipping 
companies to find out how they viewed the possibility of employing Somali/African 
seafarers. According to the responses to this questionnaire, employing African 
seafarers is not common for them at the moment. 30% of respondents (three of ten) 
answered that they were employing African seafarers; these seafarers constitute less 
than 5% of the total number of seafarers they were employing. However, there are 
three positive findings for employing African seafarers and Somali seafarers from the 
result of questionnaire. First of all, all the respondents who employ African ratings also 
 70 
 
employ African officers. This is the proof that these companies value the African 
seafarers’ ability, and perceive them to have a promising future. Secondly, all these 
respondents employing African seafarers answered that they were going to or were 
interested in increasing the employment of African seafarers, if a sustainable supply 
of qualified competent African seafarers is assured (see figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12: Begin or increase the employment of African seafarers? 
 
Finally, all those respondents who answered that they were going to or were 
interested in increasing the employment of African seafarers, also indicated that they 
were going to or interested in increasing/starting the employment of Somali seafarers 
as well (see figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Begin or increase the employment of Somali seafarers?2 
 
 
4.3.3 Deterrent to the Piracy 
 
“In your opinion, will the employment of Somali seafarers on board a ship act as a 
deterrent for Somali pirates?” To this question, 40% of respondents from shipping 
companies (four of ten) answered that they expect some positive influence more or 
less. 
 
"It seems so. But I think the robbery by an act of piracy gives more income and  
(is more) lucrative than working on vessels, and there will not be any necessity  
                                                   
2 It looks not logically that in figure 13 (answer for the question asked about begin or 
decrease of Somali seafarers) 20% of respondents answered “Yes”, although in figure 12 
(answer for the question asked about begin or increase of African seafarers) only 10% of 
respondents answered “Yes”. However, these numbers are based on the collected answers 
strictly. 
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of study, exam, and so on". 
"Yes". 
"Yes". 
"Yes, they will have jobs, but it doubts quality of education and training for  
seafarers in this country". 
 
Those who were positively inclined to employ Somali seafarers were more focused 
on their employment as a labor-supply measure and not as an anti-piracy. No 
respondent referred to the Somali ethnic groups or the clan-based structure of Somali 
society. 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, findings from the research instruments were presented. These findings 
were about the generic characteristics of Somali seafarers, Somali people's 
employment at sea as a deterrent to the piracy, the interest level of Somaliland people 
in seagoing and its feasibility, the current counter measures shipping companies are 
taking and the associated cost, the employment of African and Somali seafarers, and 
Shipping company's perspectives of employment of the latter as deterrent to piracy. 
These findings will be further discussed in the next chapter in light of the research 
questions. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion of Findings 
 
5.1 Summary of the Study 
 
As earlier stated, the purpose of this study was to interrogate validate the rationale for 
and feasibility of developing seafarer education and training in Somalia for enhanced 
provision of Somali seafarers to the international shipping industry, and the possible 
effect of this outcome of MET as a deterrent to piracy off the coast of Somalia. The 
questions were: 
 Could the sustainable development of Somali seafarers be a deterrent to the 
Somali piracy?  
 Do the Somali people have an interest in developing the Somali seafarers for 
employment in the international shipping industry? 
  Do shipping companies have an interest in employing Somali seafarers? 
 
Piracy is one of the biggest concerns for the international shipping community. Piracy 
off the coast of Somalia increased radically in 2008. The Gulf of Aden was called "the 
world's most dangerous water" (Kemp, 2013). Due to the anti-piracy measures 
conducted by stakeholders, the number of piratical attacks started decreasing from 
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2011, the peak year of the piratical attacks off the coast of Somalia. In 2015, there 
was no reported attack attributed to Somali pirates (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 
2016). This development; however, should not be taken to mean that the phenomenon 
of Somali piracy has been eradicated. Military powers, such as naval patrol and armed 
security guards may be only suppressing the tendency for piratical attacks to be 
undertaken. To address the substantive problem at it causal roots and thereby to root 
out the piratical issues off the coast of Somalia, a new solution other than temporary 
suppression by military power, should be considered. This research was conducted 
to investigate the potential of improved maritime education and training in Somalia as 
a new solution. 
 
Questionnaires and interviews were used as research instruments for the data 
collection. For questionnaires, ten answers were collected from shipping companies, 
and eleven answers were collected from the Berbera Maritime and Fisheries 
Academy (BMFA). In addition, during the onsite data collection in Somalia (Hargeisa 
and Berbera, Somaliland) between 24th and 30th July 2016, thirteen interviews were 
conducted with different stakeholders in the maritime field. Collected data was 
analyzed mainly with a qualitative approach using the computer-aided qualitative 
analysis tool "ATLAS.ti". In this chapter, findings through the analysis will be used to 
answer/discuss the research questions. Furthermore, the implications of the findings 
and associated recommendations will be stated to conclude the paper. 
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5.2 Discussion of the Findings 
5.2.1 Research Question 1 
 
Could the sustainable development of Somali seafarers be a deterrent to the Somali 
piracy? Considering the findings through the analysis of collected data, the answer to 
this question is "Yes". Seafarer education and training in Somalia could be a deterrent 
to piracy off the coast of Somalia in two ways; as an employment measure, and as a 
result of the way Somali society is structured. 
 
 As an employment measure 
 
"Poverty and crime have a very "intimate" relationship" (Berrebi, 2015). It can be 
argued strongly that the primary root of the criminal piratical activity off the coast of 
Somalia was poverty. In the past, the fishing industry off the coast of Somalia was 
despoiled and damaged by illegal, uncontrolled and unregulated (IUU) fishing activity 
of foreign vessels. This resulted in the poverty of Somali local fishermen. Counter 
activities against IUU fishing were conducted by local fishermen to protect the source 
of their livelihood and defend what is rightfully theirs. Regrettably however this led to 
the phenomenon of piracy. An internationally recognized expert on piracy, Martin N. 
Murphy (2011) called this "defensive" piracy. Poverty is therefore a primary factor in 
the generation of piratical activity off the coast of Somalia. It is noteworthy however 
that "education in all its different forms is key to breaking the cycle of poverty” 
(ChildFund International, n.d.). Development of seafarer training would raise the 
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education level in maritime field, and increase the employment opportunity. It could 
ameliorate the conditions of poverty in Somalia and by extension reduce the piratical 
problem off the coast of Somalia at its roots. 
 
A graduate of BMFA mentioned that piracy was the only way to make money for them. 
An executive of the Somaliland Counter Piracy Coordination (CPC) Office mentioned 
that if the pirates could become seafarers instead, they would never become pirates. 
Moreover, multiple number of interviewees mentioned the high employment rate of 
the graduates of the maritime academy. Employment alleviates poverty, reduce the 
tendency to resort to piracy; seafarer training is a good educational intervention to 
increase the employment rate. Seafarer training in Somalia could be a deterrent to 
the piracy off the coast of Somalia as an employment measure. 
 
 Through the influence of Somali social structures 
 
"Individual security in the traditional Somali society was dependent on the clan" 
(Landinfo, 2009, p.1). Somali people are protected by clans, and they respect the clan 
protection. Clan protection serves as a deterrent for ordinary crime, but does not work 
to restrain ideological or political crimes such as are manifest in terrorism (United 
Kingdom Home Office, 2013). Piracy off the coast of Somalia in recent years has been 
conducted to get ransom. This is the crime, based on economical motivation, but not 
ideological or political motivation. Therefore, clan protection would be effective to 
counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. 
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5.2.1 Research Question 2 
 
Do the Somali people have an interest in developing Somali seafarers for employment 
in the international shipping industry? Considering the findings and the analysis of the 
collected data, the answer to this question is "Yes, very much". More than 90% of 
BMFA students who responded to the questionnaire answered that they were 
interested in working in the international shipping context as a seafarer. More than 
70% of them ranked their interest at the highest level. They have a strong desire for 
jobs in that setting and also for income and for new experiences. Furthermore, all 
interviewees in the maritime field of Somaliland mentioned that such an interest was 
very strong. To develop the economy, and to develop the international recognition, the 
development of seafarer training is attractive for them. They would make great efforts 
if they could have a chance to develop the seafarer training in Somaliland. 
 
5.2.1 Research Question 3 
 
Do shipping companies have an interest in employing Somali seafarers? Considering 
the findings through the analysis of collected data, the answer to this question is "Not 
so much". Only 30% of them answered that they were interested in starting to employ 
Somali seafarers. However, all participating shipping companies who already employ 
African seafarers mentioned the possibility of increasing African seafarers' 
employment opportunity. Moreover, they also mentioned the possibility of the 
increasing Somali seafarers' employment opportunities to the same level. The 
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shipping companies are not interested in employing Somali seafarers so much at 
present. However, the shipping companies who already employ African seafarers 
have more interest, and the Somali seafarer has the chance to be employed at the 
same level that other Africans have. 
 
5.3 Implications of the Findings 
 
The most significant findings of this study are as follows: 
 Employing Somali seafarers could be the deterrent to the piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. 
 Somali people are strongly interested in developing seafarer training. 
 Shipping companies are not so interested in employing Somali seafarers at 
present. 
There are some implications for the international shipping companies and for Somalia. 
 
First of all, the findings suggest that assisting MET in Somalia and developing good 
relationships should be beneficial for the shipping companies. Somali people, 
especially Somaliland people, are highly motivated to develop MET in their country. 
Young Somali people are highly motivated to work in the international shipping as 
seafarers. Moreover, a basis for improved MET already exists in Somalia, the BMFA. 
If that institution could have proper assistance from the external/global community, a 
sustainable provision of relatively cost-effective and hardworking seafarers to the 
international shipping industry would be possible. 
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Furthermore, employing Somali seafarers could lower the cost of anti-piracy 
measures. In the short term, the existence of Somali seafarers itself could be the 
deterrent to the piracy off the coast of Somalia. Employing Somalis on board ship 
would represent a Somali community on any particular ship, a community other 
Somalis would not wish to attack. This is a low cost and completely legal measure, 
compared to counter measures with military power which are relatively costly and may 
involve legal problems. In the long term, employing Somali seafarers would increase 
the employment opportunities, and raise the educational level. It would lead to the 
alleviating of poverty in Somalia, and reduce the tendency to resort to crimes including 
piracy. Current anti-piracy measures cannot be deemed to solve or even address the 
root cause of piracy - poverty. The development of education and increase of 
employment opportunities could help address the root causes more significantly. 
Contributing to the improvement of poverty in Somalia with company activity, would 
also help the development of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Consequently, 
assisting the development of MET in Somalia, and employing Somali seafarers are 
suggested to international shipping companies. 
 
Finally, the findings indicate the importance of Somali people’s effort to develop their 
MET system. At present, shipping companies are not so interested in employing 
Somali seafarers. To attract the interest of the shipping companies, efforts to improve 
the MET by the Somalis themselves are needed. "Not speaking English well", and 
"the lack of understanding of foreign cultures" are weaknesses of Somali seafarers 
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mentioned a lot in the interviews. Expensive and most contemporary simulators are 
not needed to learn language and about cultures. Making the best effort as much as 
possible to improve MET, and making it appealing to the shipping companies – these 
are the suggestions to the Somali people. They would not be starting from zero. In 
Berbera, Somaliland, there is already a MET institute, BMFA. Some shipping 
companies are employing Somali seafarers. Their efforts could be made known to the 
international shipping society from this starting point. 
 
5.4 Limitation and Future Research 
 
Due to the scope and practical limitations of this work, intensive statistical analyses 
were not undertaken. It is recommended that future research be conducted with a 
greater number of participants to deepen the understanding MET in Somaliland and 
shipping companies' interest and increase the external validity of the work. 
Unfortunately, when the field study in Somaliland was conducted most students of 
BMFA were out for the summer vacation. To comprehend the level of MET in this 
country, observation and evaluation of BMFA under working condition are also 
recommended. Respondents for the shipping company questionnaire were limited to 
the Japanese shipping companies in this research. It is recommended that the sample 
size be increased in future research to the shipping companies from multiple countries 
again to improve external validity and judge better the views on employing Somali 
seafarers at a global level. 
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Furthermore, during location selection, it was decided to focus on Somaliland in this 
research. However, to get a more complete picture of the Somali seafarer, it would be 
worthwhile to consider not only Somaliland but also Puntland and South Central 
Somalia. When the other regions are also examined, it is recommended that the 
following be addressed as was done in this study: examining available places to 
develop MET and undertaking rigorous research via field study. Somalia has been 
generally perceived as a "failed state" in the world. Such notions should be based on 
empirical research facts and undertaking research in multiple places in Somalia would 
result in more academically supported perceptions of the country. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The study has adequately demonstrated, through its findings and discussions that 
developing provision of Somali seafarers could be a deterrent to piracy off the coast 
of Somalia. Understanding piracy and the history of Somalia through the 
background/literature review significantly helped the selection of the research location 
and focus. Electronical questionnaires were used effectively to collect the answers 
from remote respondents. Semi-structured interviews were used effectively to listen 
to the “real voices” of Somali people. Furthermore, the field study to Somaliland gave 
a deeper understanding during the analyses of collected data and findings. 
 
Employing Somali seafarers on-board could be a deterrent to piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. Developing seafarer training in Somalia could contribute to the eradication 
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of the poverty, and by extension piracy, in Somalia. It is also beneficial for shipping 
companies. They can cut down the costs of the anti-piracy measures. They can be 
free from the complicated legal issues surrounding naval patrols and armed security 
guards. Moreover, sustainable provision of Somali seafarers, who are a relatively 
cost-effective and hardworking workforce, would help the sustainable development of 
international shipping. "Education is one of the most powerful instruments for reducing 
poverty" (The World Bank, n.d.). It should be possible to see a day when the possibility 
of Somali piracy is eradicated at its roots, not by military power, but by education!  
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Appendix 1: Interview Consent Form 
 
Title of Research: Seafarer Training in Somalia as a deterrent to piracy 
 
Researcher: Koki MATSUSHIMA 
 
 
 
I                                                         (Name) 
 
 
of                                                        
(Organization) 
 
have agreed to participate in this research project voluntarily. 
 
I confirm that I have been made aware of the objectivities and purpose of the 
research and assured of the confidentiality of the interviews. 
 
I agree / disagree with having the interview voice-recorded. 
 
 
Pursuant to the above, I give permission for the appropriate use of the 
information gained from the interview in subsequent publications and writings 
related to the research. 
 
 
 
 
Signature:                                      Date:                      
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Appendix 2: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
To faculty of Berbera Maritime and Fisheries Academy (BMFA) 
 
Q.1 What is your position? 
 
Q.2 What is your background? 
 
Q.3 Are you interested in providing seafarers to the international shipping company 
from BMFA? 
 
Q.4 Does the MET in BMFA satisfy the requirements of STCW? 
(if yes) Q.4-1 Do you have internal or external audit system to evaluate it? 
(if no) Q.4-2 What factors are lacking to satisfy the requirements of STCW? 
 
Q.5 What are the benefits to a young person in Somaliland to pursue MET in BMFA? 
 
Q.6 What are the challenges to a young person in Somaliland to pursue MET in 
BMFA? 
 
Q7. What is the strength of Somali seafarers? 
 
Q.8 What is the weakness of Somali seafarers? 
 
Q.9 Could the existence of Somali seafarer on-board affect to piracy off the coast of 
Somalia? 
(if yes) Q.9-1 What kind of impacts could be expected? 
 
Q.10 Kindly share any opinion about the provision of Somali seafarers to the 
international shipping companies from Somaliland. 
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To officers of the Somaliland Ministries of Education, Fisheries, and Transport 
 
Q.1 What is your position? 
 
Q.2 Is Somaliland government interested in the seafarer training and providing 
seafarers to the international shipping company? 
 
Q.3 What kind of advantages could be expected for Somaliland? 
 
Q.4 What kind of advantages could be expected for the international shipping 
industry? 
 
Q.5 What kind of factors would be needed to carry out provision of Somali seafarers 
to the international shipping companies from Somaliland, and make sure the 
sustainability? 
 
Q.6 Could the existence of Somali seafarer on-board affect piracy off the coast of 
Somalia? 
(if yes) Q.6-1 What kind of impacts could be expected? 
 
Q.7 Kindly share any opinion about the provision of Somali seafarers to the 
international shipping companies from Somaliland. 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaires 
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